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During the second half of 2005, highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spread rapidly from cen-
tral Asia to eastern Europe. The relative roles of wild migra-
tory birds and the poultry trade are still unclear, given that
little is yet known about the range of virus hosts, precise
movements of migratory birds, or routes of illegal poultry
trade. We document and discuss the spread of the HPAI
H5N1 virus in relation to species-specific flyways of
Anatidae species (ducks, geese, and swans) and climate.
We conclude that the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus from
Russia and Kazakhstan to the Black Sea basin is consis-
tent in space and time with the hypothesis that birds in the
Anatidae family have seeded the virus along their autumn
migration routes.
T
he spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
H5N1 virus during 2003–2004 in eastern and south-
eastern Asia, and, in 2005–2006 westward across Asia into
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is not typical of other
HPAI epizootics. Until recent events, HPAI outbreaks or
epizootics were assumed to first require transmission of a
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus from wild
birds to domestic poultry (1). Preventive measures thus
focused on surveillance and control in poultry and on stop-
ping transmission to noninfected premises. Usually this
strategy successfully extinguished an outbreak, often with-
in the year (2). The spread of the disease back to wild birds
from domestic fowl was considered relatively rare. The
HPAI H5N1 virus is unusual in that virus infections in wild
bird populations may cause a high proportion of deaths
(3–5). A list of species that have been infected with HPAI
H5N1 virus can be found in online Appendix Table (avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol12no11/06-
0223-appT.htm). The virus also is persisting in Asia longer
than most previous HPAI epizootics, which suggests a
local reservoir (6,7).
Epidemiologic studies during 2004–05 mainly focused
on HPAI H5N1 virus persistence in relation to the agro-
ecology of poultry and duck production systems (6), and
little attention was paid to the role of wild birds in local
viral persistence or long-distance spread during that peri-
od. Because of 3 major events during mid- to late 2005,
wild birds are now suspected of spreading the HPAI H5N1
virus over long distances through migration (8,9). First, in
May 2005, a major HPAI HN51 virus outbreak was dis-
covered in wild birds in Lake Qinghai (western People’s
Republic of China), an important breeding place for migra-
tory bird species in eastern Asia. Within a few weeks, sev-
eral hundred birds, mainly bar-headed geese, had died of
the disease (4,10). Eventually, other bird species also
became affected, and several virus introductions may have
occurred. Soon after the Lake Qinghai episode, HPAI
H5N1 virus was detected in wild birds in Mongolia, to the
north of Lake Qinghai along the central migration route,
and in an area where domestic poultry were scarce (11).
Second, in October 2005, HPAI H5N1 virus spread west-
ward across Eurasia; outbreaks were recorded in Turkey,
Romania, and Ukraine, usually in or near known wintering
sites for migratory birds. This long-distance spread took
place through areas with no record of any virus presence.
Third, in spring 2006, the virus infected large numbers of
mute swans and other wild bird species across western
Europe, also in areas where no outbreaks had previously
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intensive surveillance. These incursions occurred after
unusual waterfowl movements that were associated with a
spell of cold weather in the Black Sea area where HPAI
H5N1 virus is believed to have been endemic since autumn
2005.
Arguments may also be raised against the hypothesis
that HPAI H5N1 virus is transmitted by wild birds.
Invariably, wild birds found to be infected with the virus
were either dead or moribund and may not have been able
to spread the virus over long distances. Furthermore, in sev-
eral cases, no straightforward match was found between the
appearance of the virus and the presence of the wild birds
suspected of spreading it. For example, HPAI H5N1 virus
outbreaks that took place in Russia and Kazakhstan during
summer 2005 were distributed along important trade routes
that link western People’s Republic of China to Russia (12),
rather than any direct migration pathway.
We document and discuss the possible role of migrato-
ry birds in the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus during the sec-
ond half of 2005, on the basis of information and data
concerning the role of waterfowl in the ecology of avian
influenza viruses; the pattern of Anatidae bird migrations
across the western Palearctic, and contemporary, satellite-
derived temperature data.
Role of Migratory Waterfowl in 
Ecology of Avian Influenza Viruses
Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have been recorded in
most bird families (3), but the prevalence and diversity of
AIV subtypes is not evenly distributed among them (13).
AIVs have been isolated in 12 bird orders, but most isola-
tions have been reported in the orders Anseriformes (in
particular in the family Anatidae: ducks, swans, geese) and
Charadriiformes (shore birds, gulls, terns). Although a
wide variety of AIV subtypes have been isolated from
Charadriiformes (13,14), they are believed to belong to a
somewhat different genetic pool from those isolated in
Anseriformes (15).
Species from the Anatidae family, in particular, the
Anatinae subfamily (ducks), represent the highest risk for
transmission to domestic poultry (16,17) for the following
reasons: 1) Anatids harbor the most diverse and highest
prevalence of avian influenza viruses (13,14); 2) historical
outbreaks of HPAI in poultry have been linked mainly to
strains circulating in ducks, rather than in members of
other species (18,19); 3) domestic ducks (mallards) can
excrete large amounts of HPAI H5N1 virus while remain-
ing relatively healthy and are thus able to move the virus
across large distances (7); and 4) direct contacts between
wild anatids and domestic aquatic poultry are believed to
be relatively more common than with other groups of wild
birds (20).
Most waterfowl migrate seasonally, to exploit tempo-
rary feed resources during spring and summer, while
escaping harsh winter conditions (21). An important evo-
lutionary incentive for these migrations is the prolific
spring growth in the Arctic, which provides plants and
insects rich in the calcium and protein required for egg
production (the female mallard duck produces 8–12 eggs)
and juvenile growth (22). However, the favorable season
for breeding is very short in these higher latitudes, and
migratory bird populations soon start migrating southward
with their juveniles to escape the frosts that occur from
midsummer onward (23). This frequently results in premi-
gration concentrations of many species of waterfowl south
of the breeding areas, where juvenile maturation and adult
molting take place before the main southward migration in
the autumn. This seasonal aggregation mixes many species
with high densities of immunologically naive juveniles
alongside adult birds, which are unable to fly for up to 1
month while they molt; this setting is ideal for AIV trans-
mission and redistribution. Previous work on AIV ecology
has shown that premigration concentrations of waterfowl,
together with the high recruitment rate of immunological-
ly naive juveniles, induce a seasonally and geographically
distinct pattern in AIV prevalence with peaks observed just
before autumn migrations in interspecies concentration
areas (13,24). During the subsequent southwest wards
migration, AIV prevalence declines as a result of increased
flock immunity and progressive dispersal of bird popula-
tions (13,24,25). Although AIV is more difficult to detect
in waterfowl during winter and spring, several studies
reviewed by Stallknecht and Shane (13) reported that AIV
isolates persist until spring. De Marco et al. (26) demon-
strated that AIV circulated continually from November to
March in wintering areas. The high level of flock immuni-
ty and the relatively low level of AIV isolation during win-
ter and spring raise the question of AIV survival during
this time in the annual cycle  (13). The survival of the virus
in water and ice (27) may play a critical role, in terms of
virus persistence and in terms of facilitating fecal-oral AIV
transmission (16). The possible overwintering of AIV in
shallow and cold water (28) in the Pan-Arctic region and
the concentrations during postsummer-breeding and trans-
mission of AIV between subpopulations and bird species
during premigration may help sustain the natural AIV
cycle. A redistribution of AIV among birds that use differ-
ent migration routes may well contribute to the survival of
the virus across a wide geographic range.
Anatidae Migration Patterns in the 
Western Palearctic
Northeastern Russia and Siberia are major breeding
areas for many migratory Anatidae species in the Palearctic.
Birds arrive during the spring, traveling different routes
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Anatidae Migration and H5N1 Virusfrom Europe, Asia, and Africa. Of particular importance is
the west Siberian lowlands (WSL), which has an area of
2,745,000 km2 and is by far the largest wetlands in the
world (Figure 1). WSL is an important breeding area,
along with several other large wetlands located in north-
western Russia and northern Scandinavia (Figure 1). In
western Europe, the main wetlands that support wintering
waterfowl are found along the coastal areas of Denmark,
the Netherlands, United Kingdom, France (the Rhône
delta), Spain, and northern Italy. In central Europe and
western Asia, major wetland areas are found around the
Black Sea in Ukraine, Romania (the Danube delta), and
Turkey; around the Caspian Sea in Russia and Iran; and in
the southeastern part of Iraq. Three recognized routes, or
flyways, connect breeding areas to wintering areas in the
western Palearctic (29) are shown on the overlay of indi-
vidual species flyways in Figure 2A. The North Sea flyway
joins the wetlands of northwestern Russia to western
Europe wintering sites and runs through Scandinavia, the
Baltic basin, and the North Sea. The Black Sea and
Caspian Sea flyways run from the WSL, leading to
Mediterranean Europe and western Asia, respectively.
When weighted according to the number of birds that use
them (Figure 2B), the North Sea flyway stands out as the
most important, followed by the Black Sea; the Caspian
Sea flyway is of least consequence.
Migration Patterns and Spread of HPAI H5N1
Virus across the Western Palearctic
During July and August 2005, several HPAI H5N1
virus outbreaks were reported in Russia and Kazakhstan
(Figure 1). These occurred in domestic poultry, but the
strains were genetically related to the Lake Qinghai strain
(30). Early in October 2005, HPAI H5N1 virus was first
encountered in wild fowl and in poultry in Turkey and
Romania and in dead swans in Croatia. Again, the
sequenced virus was found to be identical to that from
Lake Qinghai. This same virus was detected in Ukraine in
December 2005 (31).
Amission of the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) to Kazakhstan established that the first outbreaks
were located near important molting sites for migratory
waterfowl. This finding is further illustrated in Figure 1,
which depicts the WSL breeding area, where the first frost
took place as early as July (the pale green pixels). The pre-
migration concentration of wild bird populations for molt-
ing takes place just south of the WSL. HPAI H5N1 virus
may have been brought into southern Siberia through the
poultry trade and related traffic, in particular, through the
trans-Siberian commercial route (12), and, from there, may
have entered the wild bird population. However, the
observed patterns of virus circulation are also consistent
with the critical steps in AIV transmission and redistribu-
tion (13), and HPAI H5N1 virus may have already been
present in the wild bird population during the 2005 spring
season in the WSL or at the molting sites and transmitted
from there to domestic poultry at the time of main virus
transmission in the premigration concentration areas.
The initial outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 virus in Romania,
Turkey, and Ukraine occurred close to wetlands frequent-
ed by overwintering migratory waterfowl. These locations
were clearly far from any known location where HPAI
H5N1 virus had been recorded, while the timing and loca-
tion match the autumn wildfowl migration ahead of the
approaching wave of frost (Figure 1).
Figure 2C illustrates the population-weighted overlay
of all Anatidae species flyways that coincide with locations
of HPAI H5N1 virus in Russia and Kazakhstan observed
during the summer 2005, i.e., the spread to be expected if
only the bird species using the Caspian Sea flyway had
been responsible for further spread. Figure 2D shows the
population-weighted overlay of species flyways in relation
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Figure 1. Map showing the spread of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus
and its environmental context. The back-
ground color indicates the month when the
first frost was observed, from July through
December 2005. The distribution of the main
wetlands is indicated (dark blue; west
Siberian lowland [WSL]). The reported pres-
ence of HPAI H5N1 virus from July 2005 to
January 16, 2006, is indicated by squares
with color coding for the first report of HPAI
H5N1 virus in the country, and by green dots
for other records.to locations of HPAI H5N1 virus until January 2006. This
figure suggests that the Black Sea flyway was also infect-
ed if anatids did indeed spread HPAI H5N1 virus through
their autumn migration. This apparent discrepancy
between HPAI H5N1 virus outbreak locations (Figure 2D)
and the pattern of spread that could have been expected
from the summer outbreaks locations (Figure 2C) requires
further attention. First, the northern limits of the 2 flyways
are so close that a figure similar to Figure 2D is obtained
just with the summer outbreaks if one simply allows for a
200-km variation in the flyway border or if HPAI H5N1
virus presence is assumed to have occurred 200 km further
westward. Second, the boundaries between the flyways are
arbitrary; these flyways mainly represent directions taken
by subpopulations, representing most diffusive migration
paths. A large fraction of wild bird populations distributed
across the area with locations of HPAI H5N1 virus report-
ed presence in Russia and Kazakhstan connect to the Black
Sea basin (actually, the number of anatids flying from
Siberia down to the Black Sea is higher than the number
flying to the Caspian Sea basin; Figure 2B). Given the
above uncertainties, one may reasonably assume that
waterfowl from both flyways may have become infected
when they met in premigration concentration areas.
If these flyways are assumed to be used by infected
birds, their geographic extent may be used to estimate an
index of risk for virus transmission from wildfowl to
domestic poultry. The population-weighted overlay of
individual waterfowl species’ ranges intersecting with
HPAI H5N1 virus locations (Figure 2B) can, in turn, be
intersected with the wintering areas’ boundaries (rescaled
from 0 to 1 as an index of wintering site suitability) to
delineate the areas where migrating birds are more likely
to concentrate. This layer can then be multiplied by over-
all poultry population density (32) to derive a coarse meas-
ure of risk for an HPAI H5N1 virus outbreak to occur in
domestic poultry (Figure 2E). The resulting display high-
lights the high-risk areas on the Black Sea coast, in partic-
ular, areas adjacent to the wintering areas in Romania,
Turkey, and Russia, but also parts of Greece, along the
Adriatic coast, the Nile delta, and along the southern edges
of the Caspian Sea. A relatively high risk is found across
western Europe, which reflects not only the high density of
poultry but also the fact that a cluster of 3 westernmost
outbreaks in Russia intersect with multiple western
European flyways.
Discussion
Our results indicate that the broad-scale pattern of
spread of HPAI H5N1 virus from Russia to the Black Sea
basin is consistent with the spatial and temporal pattern of
Anatidae migration from Siberia. Given that the first
recorded signs of HPAI H5N1 virus in Turkey, Romania,
and Ukraine took place in the direct vicinity of important
waterfowl overwintering sites, Anatidae could have been
implicated in the spread of HPAI H5N1 virus to the Black
Sea basin. The search for wild bird species carrying HPAI
H5N1 virus is in progress and awaits further classification.
Several species demonstrably carry the virus without
showing clinical signs, as has been recently reported from
studies in Russia (30) and People’s Republic of China (8).
Most wild birds found dead were geese, swans, and, rarely,
wild ducks (when domestic ducks were found infected
with, and sometimes dead from HPAI H5N1 virus, this
occurred in conjunction with disease outbreaks in terrestri-
al poultry), which supports the hypothesis that not only
mallards but also several other duck species are healthy
carriers of HPAI H5N1 virus. The postulate that migratory
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Figure 2. Distribution overlay of migratory flyways of Anatidae bird
species in the western Palearctic: each pixel of gray shading indi-
cates the number of species that include the area as part of their
flyway. A) All species with an equal weight (indicative of species
diversity by pixel). B) Flyways weighted according to their popula-
tion (indicative of anatid populations). Population-weighted distri-
bution overlay for flyways intersecting highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus records are shown for C) July through
August and D) July through December. E) The maps displayed
present the product of map B by the overlay of anatids wintering
distribution and by the log10 of poultry density, as an index of the
risk for transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus from anatids to domestic
poultry in their wintering sites under the affected flyways. 
Anatidae Migration and H5N1 Virusanatids can spread the disease over long distances by no
means excludes the role of the poultry trade as an impor-
tant, complementary transmission pathway.
It could be argued that an important contradiction of the
hypothesis that wild birds spread HPAI H5N1 virus along
their migration paths stems from our “false-positive” pre-
dictions (e.g., Figure 2E, Spain, Morocco, Greece). We
propose 3 possible explanations for these deviations. First,
as well as being along flyways of infected wild bird, estab-
lishment of HPAI H5N1 virus in domestic poultry may
require additional conditions: 1) an aggregation of water-
fowl for a sufficient period (more risk for transmission
within wintering areas than at more transient stopover
sites), 2) a high proportion of small poultry farms and
backyard poultry, and 3) extensive (aquatic) poultry units
in contact with waterfowl populations and habitat, i.e.,
floodplain or other forms of wetland agriculture in close
proximity to natural wetlands used as wildfowl wintering
sites. Such conditions have been shown to be associated
with HPAI H5N1 virus persistence in Southeast Asia (6)
and were certainly also met in parts of Romania, Turkey,
and Ukraine. Second, the overall prevalence of HPAI
H5N1 virus found in wild bird populations was very low,
usually <1% (8). This finding suggests that virus persist-
ence in wild bird populations may be subject to stochastic
fluctuation. Also, few infected individual birds are likely to
be evenly distributed in the population; i.e., the distribu-
tion of infected birds is probably clustered. The scarcity of
infected individual birds and their likely clustering pro-
duce a pattern in which several regions exposed to equiva-
lent wintering populations may have been exposed to
different levels of virus exposure. Finally, HPAI H5N1
virus was found either in dead and apparently healthy
ducks, which suggests a dichotomy in wild bird suscepti-
bility. The exact status of species, as sentinels or spreaders,
and precise migratory pattern may help explain any incon-
sistencies that arise from considering all species at equal
risk for transmission.
One could also mention here the discrepancies between
the geographic spread of HPAI H5N1 virus and overall
pattern of wild bird migrations: the virus has never been
reported in the Philippines and in several countries farther
south such as New Zealand and Australia (although these
2 countries have no migratory anatid populations connect-
ing them to Southeast Asia, they do have many shore bird
and wader species in common [20]). Conversely, with the
possible exception of African countries, HPAI H5N1 virus
was established in domestic poultry only in countries con-
nected by flyways with existing infected countries. The
introduction in Nigeria is inconclusive. Two species of
dabbling ducks, Anas querquedula and  A. acuta, have
large wintering concentrations in and near Lake Chad and
in the Niger delta, both under the western Siberia/Black
Sea flyways, and are presumed to be infected by HPAI
H5N1 virus. However, Nigeria imported large numbers of
poultry from Turkey and People’s Republic of China until
a ban was imposed, and illegal trade may well have contin-
ued after the ban and brought in infected animals or prod-
ucts (33).
The broad approach adopted in this study has clear lim-
itations, given the uncertainties regarding the host range of
HPAI H5N1 virus within the Anatidae family, the sizes and
distribution of the bird populations, their precise migrato-
ry patterns, and the demarcation of the summer and winter
habitat. A comprehensive retrospective analysis of HPAI
H5N1 virus spread in the western Palearctic would require
a better description of the dynamic distribution of wild
birds (breeding range, wintering sites, stopover sites,
migration pathways) as well as more detailed domestic
poultry data (distribution, production structure, species
composition, movements through trade) to map the contact
points between wild and domestic birds. In addition, local
studies could focus on possible introduction points and
characterize and detail the specific ecologic conditions in
the wild birds–domestic poultry interface that support
establishment of the virus, including the local landscape
structure (wild bird habitat and farming), climate (e.g.,
virus survival in the environment), and other agro-ecolog-
ic conditions.
Experimental Procedure 
Imagery 
We used the land surface temperature (LST) data prod-
ucts derived from the Moderate Resolution Imaging
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensor on board the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Aqua satellite
(34). The Aqua satellite acquires daytime images (a local
pass time of 1:30 P.M. at the equator) and nighttime images
(a local pass time of 1:30 A.M. at the equator). A day/night
algorithm was applied to a pair of MODIS daytime and
nighttime observations to extract average temperature
(when multiple observations are available), and the
method yields an accuracy of 1°K with known emissivities
(34).
Daily LST products were aggregated (averaged) to gen-
erate 8-day composite LST product (MYD11A2), and 46
of these 8-day composite LST products are generated per
year. The LST product has a spatial resolution of 1 km. We
downloaded the 8-day composite LST data (MYD11A2) in
2005 from the US Geological Survey Earth Resources
Observation and Science (EROS) Data Center. For each
individual 1-km pixel, we analyzed time series data of
nighttime LST in 2005 and identified the first 8-day peri-
od that experienced frost (LST<0°C) in the fall/winter sea-
sons. We assume that the date of early frost events in
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fall/winter seasons is one of many factors that affect the
starting date of wild bird migration from north to south.
Distribution Overlays 
Distribution data regarding the winter feeding areas and
summer breeding areas were extracted from the Global
Registry of Migratory Species CD-ROM (35). The data on
migration flyways were digitized directly from Scott and
Rose (36). All boundaries were smoothed by a 2.5-decimal
degrees filter to avoid sharp edges in distribution bound-
aries. The population estimates from Delany and Scott (37)
were assigned to each flyway. In the population-weighted,
each flyway contribution was estimated as its relative con-
tribution to the total population of Anatidae along all fly-
ways multiplied by 100 (100× Popflyway/PopAnatidae).
The species included in the analysis are the following:
Anas acuta, Anser albifrons, Anser anser, Anser
brachyrhynchus, Anas clypeata, Anas crecca, Anser ery-
thropus, Anser fabalis, Aythya ferina, Aythya fuligula,
Aythya marila, Aythya nyroca, Anas penelope, Anas
platyrhynchos, Anas querquedula, Anas strepera, Branta
bernicla, Bucephala clangula, Branta leucopsis, Branta
ruficollis, Cygnus columbianus, Cygnus cygnus, Clangula
hyemalis, Cygnus olor, Mergellus albellus, Marmaronetta
angustirostris, Melanitta fusca, Mergus merganser,
Melanitta nigra, Mergus serrator, Netta rufina, Oxyura
leucocephala, Polysticta stelleri, Somateria mollissima,
Tadorna ferruginea, Tadorna tadorna. The data on HPAI
locations were extracted from HPAI H5N1 virus reported
presence, as recorded in the FAO Empres-I database (31)
between July 1, 2005, and January 16, 2006.
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